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The Varying Effects of Predatory Lending Laws
on High-Cost Mortgage Applications
Giang Ho and Anthony Pennington-Cross
Federal, state, and local predatory lending laws are designed to restrict and in some cases prohibit
certain types of high-cost mortgage credit in the subprime market. Empirical evidence using the
spatial variation in these laws shows that the aggregate flow of high-cost mortgage credit can
increase, decrease, or be unchanged after these laws are enacted. Although it may seem counter-
intuitive to find that a law that prohibits lending could be associated with more lending, it is
hypothesized that a law may reduce the cost of sorting honest loans from dishonest loans and lessen
borrowers’ fears of predation, thus stimulating the high-cost mortgage market. (JEL G21, C25)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2007, 89(1), pp. 39-59.
ing some of the potential ways that a law could
affect the flow of high-cost or subprime mortgage
credit. The specific provisions of the laws vary
state by state, and this creates the possibility that
each law may affect mortgage applications, origi-
nations, and rejections in different ways. For
example, the first state-level predatory lending
law (in North Carolina) did significantly reduce
applications and originations of high-cost mort-
gages, whereas some other laws subsequently
passed were associated with increases in applica-
tions and originations.
TYPES OF PREDATORY LENDING
HUD and the Treasury published an influential
report in 2000 entitled “Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending.” The report organized lending
abuses or predatory practices into four groups:
• Loan flipping: Loans were being repeatedly
refinanced in a short period of time (loan
flipping). With each refinance, high fees
were wrapped into the new loan amount,
Documents that discuss predatorylending begin with a statement sim-ilar to that found in a report by theDepartment of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the Department of the
Treasury (HUD and Treasury, 2000, p. 17):
“Defining the practices that make a loan preda-
tory, however, is problematic.” This difficulty
arises because predatory lending depends on the
inability of the borrower to understand the loan
terms and the obligations associated with them.
The amorphous nature of predation has made it
very difficult for federal, state, and local author-
ities to craft laws to stop or at least retard preda-
tion without also hindering legitimate lending.
However, following the lead of federal regula-
tions, state and local authorities have passed
laws that have made it illegal to provide certain
types of high-cost loans that have been associated
with predation. Implicitly, lawmakers have deter-
mined that the benefit of stopping predation out-
weighs the costs associated with restricting some
legitimate high-cost loans.
This paper provides a framework for consider-
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thus reducing the equity left in the home.
In some instances, fees exceeded $5,000 or
as much as 10 percent of the loan amount.
• Imposition of excessive fees and “packing”:
Fees were found to be very large at times.
Typically, fees were added to the financed
amount (wrapped) instead of being paid
upfront. Perhaps most importantly, the con-
sumers often were not aware of the fees,
which could be charged by many different
sources, including the mortgage broker,
home improvement contractor, lender, or
other third parties. In addition to normal
closing fees,1 some of the borrowers were
sold single-premium credit life insurance,
whichwas included in the loan amount and
not used in the calculation of the annual
percentage rate (APR).
• Lending without regard for the ability to
repay: Loans were originated under terms
that the borrower would never be able to
meet. This problem was exacerbated when
the lender did not try to verify income,
which may have been falsified by a broker.
Examples were found of elderly households
on fixed incomes where the new mortgage
payment exceeded their income. Once the
borrower failed to make payments, the
lender foreclosed on the property. Clearly,
this practice is profitable only when the
amount of equity in the home exceeds the
cost of foreclosure and the borrower does
not exercise the option to sell the home and
prepay the mortgage before foreclosure.
• Fraud: Appraisers and brokers conspired
to inflate prices or property values above
the market price.
Based on these findings, the report recom-
mended improved consumer literacy and disclo-
sures, as well as prohibitions on loan flipping,
lending without regard for the ability to repay, and
the sale of insurance and other similar products.
The report also recommended that potentially
abusive terms and conditions such as balloon
payments, prepayment penalties, excessive fees,
and “points” be restricted.2
STATE PREDATORY LENDING
LAWS
During this period of increased public atten-
tion, Congress strengthened the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA, Regulation Z)
that focuses on high-cost refinance loans.3 For
loans that meet the HOEPA definition of high-cost
loans, the provisions restrict short-term balloon
notes, prepayment penalties, non-amortizing
schedules, loan documentation requirements,
the ability to refinance into another HOEPA loan,
and other factors.
Following the lead of federal regulations, by
the end of 2004, at least 23 states had put into
effect predatory lending laws that regulated the
provision of high-cost credit.4 In general, these
state laws extend HOEPA’s definition by expand-
ing the definition of high-cost credit by lowering
the factors that trigger the coverage of a law and by
more aggressively restricting some types of loans
and lending practices. For example, the Illinois
law moves the APR trigger for first liens from 8
percent (the HOEPA trigger) above comparable-
term Treasury yields to 6 percent.5 As a result, the
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1 Typical closing fees include items that all real estate transactions
must pay such as transfer taxes, appraisal fees, recording fees, title
search fees, and other processing fees.
2 Balloon payments have a large, lump sum payment at the end of
the life of the loan.
3 Home purchase loans and other types of lending backed by a home,
such as lines of credit, are not covered by HOEPA. The original
version, in 1994, set out the framework and defined the triggers
and restrictions. The second version, in 2002, adjusted some of
the triggers and restricted some additional practices. In the 2002
version, HOEPA protections were triggered in one of two ways:
(i) if the loan’s APR exceeded the rate for Treasury securities of
comparable maturity by 8 percentage points or more on the first lien
and 10 percentage points or higher on higher liens or (ii) if finance
charges, including points and fees paid at closing for optional insur-
ance programs and other debt protection programs, were greater
than 8 percent of the loan amount or a fixed $480 amount indexed
annually to the consumer price index.
4 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.
5 The APR is a uniformmeasure of true or full annual borrower cost.
For example, the APR includes annualized costs associated with
upfront fees in addition to the periodic interest rate.
Illinois predatory regulations cover a larger seg-
ment of the mortgage market than do federal regu-
lations. However, not all states extend regulations
in the same manner. For example, the laws in
Indiana and Kentucky do not lower the APR trigger
below the federal 8 percent level. However, both
the Indiana and Kentucky laws include loans used
to purchase a home in addition to just refinances.
Similar to federal regulations, the Illinois law
covers only refinance loans (loans not for purchase
of a new home). In general, each law has its own
nuances. For example, the laws in Illinois,
Indiana, and Kentucky all restrict the use of bal-
loon payments. However, Kentucky prohibits all
balloon payments on high-cost loans, whereas
Indiana and Illinois prohibit balloons within the
first 10 years of a loan’s life and for all loans that
last 15 years or less, respectively.
The appendix provides some of the details
associated with the 10 laws that are used in the
empirical analysis discussed below.6 As with
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, the law can vary
substantially among states. For example, 6 of the
10 states (Connecticut, Florida, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas) specify the same
trigger as HOEPA: For first (second) liens, an APR
8 (10) percent or higher than comparable-term
Treasury yields will activate coverage of the loan
by the law. California and Massachusetts reduce
the APR trigger for either first or second liens,
thus making the law cover more of the market.
Georgia uses a different approach and instead
defines the trigger relative to the prime rate instead
of Treasury yields.
There is also substantial variation in what
types of loans are prohibited by the law. For exam-
ple, Georgia, Massachusetts, and North Carolina
prohibit all balloon payments on covered loans,
whereas Maryland has no provision covering
balloons. The remaining states tend to restrict
the availability of balloons for the first 5 to 10
years of a loan.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF
APPLICATION OUTCOMES
Although the minute variations in the laws
are almost limitless, it is helpful to illustrate
some of the potential effects of a predatory lending
law using a highly stylized model of mortgage
application outcomes (subprime applications,
subprime originations, and subprime rejections).
We assume that applicants understand that a sub-
prime mortgage costs more than a prime mortgage
and self-select to the appropriate market.7 Follow-
ing the approach of Ferguson and Peters (1995)
and Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2002),
we assume that all of the information included
in the application can be summarized by a single
number (mortgage credit score or credit risk).
Each loan applicant has a credit risk represented
by 0   Φ   1. We interpret Φ as a monotonically
increasing function of the borrower’s likelihood
of default, and we designate the marginal proba-
bility density function of credit risk as r (Φ).
Assuming mortgage lenders can observe the true
credit risk of borrowers, they approve all loan
applications with credit risk lower than a uniform
underwriting cut-off, which we denote as ΦP for
the prime market andΦS for the subprime market,
with ΦP < ΦS.
In this model, the prime market is perfectly
sorted; everyone who applies for a prime mort-
gage has credit risk Φ   ΦP and therefore is
approved for a loan. Although we do observe in
the marketplace some rejections of prime appli-
cations, empirical research has shown that sub-
prime loans are rejected at a much higher rate
than prime loans: 33 percent versus 9 percent
(Scheessele, 1998). In addition, the assumption
of perfect sorting, or borrower self-selection, does
not affect the suggested impact of predatory lend-
ing laws on the outcome of subprime mortgage
applications. In Figure 1, prime applications and
originations are given by the same integral of the
marginal density function and are represented
by the area OP:
Ho and Pennington-Cross
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007 41
6 See Ho and Pennington-Cross (2005) for details on all 23 state-level
laws in effect before the end of 2004.
7 In essence we are assuming that no unqualified households apply
for a prime loan (i.e., self-select themselves out of that market) or
that the lender presorts potential applications to reduce rejections
in the prime market. Therefore, there are no rejected prime loans.
(1)
Applicants with credit risk higher than the
prime underwriting standard, ΦP, are subprime
applicants. However, assuming there is a cost
associated with applying for a loan, an individual
will apply only if he/she thinks the chance of
being accepted is sufficiently high. This borrower
self-selection implies that a fraction of individuals
with credit risk higher than a certain level—we
refer to these as the “marginal applicants”—will
opt out of the subprimemarket, effectively altering
the risk distribution. We define α (Φ; ΦS) as the
share of actual subprime applicants in the poten-
tial applicant universe; α is indexed by Φ, given
the current subprime underwriting standard (ΦS).
For potential subprime applicants with Φ   ΦS,
α (Φ;ΦS) equals unity. The probability of applying,
α (Φ; ΦS), is continuous and decreasing for Φ >
ΦS until it equals zero at some value Φ′, where
ΦS < Φ′   1. The applicants who opt out and do
A O r dP P
P
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not apply are shown as the shaded area in Figure 1
and would be rejected if they did apply.
Given the current subprime underwriting
standard, ΦS, and the risk distribution, r (Φ), the
number of applicants, AS, originations, OS, and
rejections, RS, are shown in Figure 1 and given by
(2)
The number of applicants can also be represented
as the sum of originations and rejections,
AS = OS + RS.
Assume that a predatory lending law imposes
restrictions on subprime mortgage lenders in
terms of information disclosure, allowable loan
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Φ
f(Φ)
ΦP ΦS
r (Φ)α(Φ;ΦS)
r(Φ) OP OS
RS
Figure 1
Prime and Subprime Mortgage Outcomes
NOTE: r (Φ) = marginal probability function of credit risk;
α (Φ; ΦS) = subprime application rate; ΦP = prime underwriting
standard; ΦS = subprime underwriting standard; OP = prime
originations; OS = subprime originations; RS = subprime
rejections.
Φ
f(Φ)
ΦP ΦS
r (Φ)α(Φ;ΦS)
r(Φ) OP OS´
RS´
ΦS´
r (Φ)α(Φ;ΦS´)
Figure 2
Post-Law Scenario: Tightening Subprime
Underwriting Standards
NOTE: r (Φ) = marginal probability function of credit risk;
α (Φ; ΦS ′) = subprime application rate; ΦP = prime underwriting
standard; ΦS = pre-law subprime underwriting standard;
ΦS ′ = post-law subprime underwriting standard;OP = prime
originations; OS ′ = post-law subprime originations; RS ′ = post-
law subprime rejections.
types, and required lending practices. To comply
with the law’s restrictions, lenders must tighten
underwriting standards fromΦS toΦS′. This post-
law scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. The law
results in fewer subprime loans being originated,
because of the tighter minimum lending standards
required to comply with the predatory lending
law:
(3)
The total number of subprime applicants also
decreases after the law is implemented because
more “marginal applicants,” fearing higher prob-
ability of rejection, self-select out of the subprime
market. For all values of Φ >ΦS′, r (Φ)α (Φ; ΦS) >
r (Φ)α (Φ; ΦS′), and, as a result, AS > AS′.
Depending on the functional form of α (.), the
number of rejected applications could increase
or decrease if lending standards are tightened,
especially if the likelihood of applying is affected
by the level of credit risk8:
(4)
In addition, the rejection rate or the ratio of
rejections to applications could either increase
or decrease—again, depending on the function
of α (.).
This analysis allows us to develop testable
hypotheses regarding the impact of a predatory
lending law on subprime mortgage outcomes.
Specifically, we expect that the introduction of
a law that tightens lending standards will reduce
(relative to the prime market) the number of sub-
prime applications and originations. In addition,
the impact of a law that tightens lending stan-
dards on subprime rejection rates should be
indeterminate.
Finally, we introduce what we call the
“lemons effect,” as pioneered by Akerlof (1970),
into the subprime mortgage market. In this type of
market, loans can be sold honestly or dishonestly.
The borrower attempts to sort the honest loans
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from the dishonest loans. Unfortunately, regulatory
agencies (HUD and the Treasury) and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System did
find some evidence from task-force interviews
and openmeetings that some subprime borrowers,
typically elderly or poorly educated households,
have had difficulty sorting the honest loans from
the dishonest loans (HUD and the Treasury, 2000,
and Board of Governors, 2002).
In a market with some dishonest loans, all
borrowers must exert extra effort and time to
screen the lender and loan documents (higher
transaction costs). The press, government reports,
and local nonprofit agencies have informed the
public about the presence of predatory lending,
or dishonest loans, in the subprime market. This
uncertainty in loan quality, the lemons effect, can
deter subprime applications and is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Here we introduce a shift function Λ(Φ; ΦP)
that equals zero for Φ   ΦP and a constant k,
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007 43
8 However, if α(.) is a linear decreasing function of (Φ – Φj), where j
indexes the lending standards S and S′, the number of rejected
applications will increase when lending standards are tightened.
Φ
f(Φ)
ΦP ΦS
r (Φ)Λ(Φ;ΦP)α(Φ;ΦS)
r(Φ) OP
OSL
RSL
r (Φ)Λ(Φ;ΦP)
Figure 3
The “Lemons Effect”
NOTE: r (Φ) = marginal probability function of credit risk;
Λ(Φ; ΦP) = lemons shift function; α (Φ; ΦS) = subprime appli-
cation rate; ΦP = prime underwriting standard; ΦS = subprime
underwriting standard;OP = prime originations;OSL = subprime
originations under the lemons effect; RSL = subprime rejections
under the lemons effect.
0 < k < 1, for ΦP < Φ   1. Λ(.) can be interpreted
as the fraction of potential subprime applicants
that are deterred from applying for fear of falling
prey to predatory lending or because of the addi-
tional transaction costs associatedwith identifying
the dishonest loan or lender. Therefore, the risk
distribution becomes kinked atΦP and shifts down
for all applicants with credit risk above ΦP. The
resulting subprime originations and rejections
are represented in Figure 3 by areas OSL and RSL,
respectively, and subprime applications equal
OSL + RSL.
Given the perception that predation has
occurred in the subprime market and not in the
prime market, the volume of lending as measured
by the number of originations and applications
may be lower than expected, given the distribu-
tion of credit risk, r (Φ). One of the primary pur-
poses of predatory lending laws is to weed out
the “lemons” in the subprime mortgage market.
If households feel that the predatory lending law
has been successful, there may be less need to
spend time and energy to identify the dishonest
loans; they may feel more comfortable applying
for a mortgage. In this scenario Λ(.) is reduced to
zero or is much closer to zero. Therefore, if the
subprime market is operating as a lemons market,
the introduction of the predatory lending law
should have two countervailing effects. First, as
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the law should
reduce applications and originations because of
tighter lending standards. Second, as illustrated
in Figure 3, if the law removes or heavily regulates
the dishonest loans, it should induce potential
applicants to return to the market. Therefore, in
markets with a substantial lemons problem, or big
Λ(.), the impact of a predatory lending law could
be neutral or could increase the rate of subprime
applications and originations. In addition, if Λ(.)
is not strictly proportional, but has a larger impact
on potential borrowers closer or farther away from
ΦS, then the introduction of a predatory lending
law could increase or decrease rejection rates.
In summary, in the absence of a lemons prob-
lem, the introduction of a law that tightens lending
standards should be associated with lower origi-
nations and applications for subprime loans. How-
ever, if the market suffers from a lemons problem,
a new law can actually be associated with more
applications and originations. Lastly, this simple
model provides no guidance regarding potential
effects of the law on rejections.
UNIVARIATE EVIDENCE:
PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
AND THE FLOW OF CREDIT
The first empirical test examines the laws’
impact on the volume of lending. If volume is
unaffected, then the aggregate flow of and the
supply of credit to potential consumers has not
been affected in the aggregate. This method gen-
erally follows Harvey and Nigro’s (2004) research
on the North Carolina predatory lending law,
which found that this law significantly reduced
subprime applications and originations but had
no measurable impact on the rates of rejection.
In particular, this section extends prior research
by examining the effects in a variety of locations
and seeing whether the North Carolina experience
is representative for other states.
In each state, we examine the change in origi-
nations for subprime loans under the prescribed
loan limits in the year before and the year after
the predatory lending law is introduced; we use
publicly available HomeMortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data.9 Growth rates are calculated for
loans associated with a list of subprime lenders
as identified by the HUD subprime lender list.10
Any loan application or origination associated
with a lender on the list is identified as a subprime
loan. All other loans are treated as non-subprime—
that is, conventional loans. In an attempt to create
comparison groups that are as similar as possible,
9 The results are very similar if we do not apply loan limits (to
reduce the sample).
10 The source is www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html, accessed on
2/1/05. HUD generates a list of subprime lenders from industry
trade publications, HMDA data analysis, and phone calls to the
lender to confirm the extent of subprime lending. Because this
list is defined at the lender level, loans made by the subprime
lender may include both prime and subprime loans. In addition,
subprime loans made by predominately prime lenders will also be
incorrectly identified as prime lending. Therefore, an alternative
interpretation of the loans identified using the HUD subprime
lender list is that it identifies the extent of specialized subprime
lending, not full-service lending.
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only counties that border other states without a
state predatory lending law are used for the treat-
ment group. The control group includes only
counties in neighboring states that border the
treatment state and do not have a predatory lend-
ing law in effect during the observed time period
(the year before and after the introduction of the
predatory lending law). This contrasts with other
studies (Harvey and Nigro, 2004, and Elliehausen
and Staten, 2004) that have used whole neighbor-
ing states or regions to define both control and
treatment groups. Our approach should help to
increase the comparability of the treatment group
and the control group because they are geographi-
cally closer and, as a result, likely to be more
economically similar than full state and region
comparisons.
Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, at
least 23 states have passed predatory lending laws
that are currently in effect. However, the empirical
approach combinedwith the availability of HMDA
data reduces the sample to 10 states with predatory
lending laws: California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland,Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
Table 1 reports the percent change in loan
originations. Using North Carolina as an example,
the results show that, from 1999 through 2001,
subprime originations decreased by 35.8 percent
in the treatment counties while subprime origi-
nations decreased by 18.9 percent in the control
counties. In other words, consistent with prior
research on the North Carolina predatory lending
law, subprime originations decreased substantially
more than would be expected given the perform-
ance of the control counties. This is also true in
four other states (Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
and Ohio). However, in five states (California,
Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas),
subprime originations increased more in the
treatment locations.11 These results indicate that
the experience in North Carolina may not extend
to all other states with predatory lending laws
and that there may be sufficient variation in the
laws that may increase or decrease the flow of
credit.
The second and third columns examine the
relative growth rates in originations for minority
and low-income applicants.12 Again, the results
are mixed: Some locations experienced a relative
increase and others a relative decrease in subprime
originations.
Table 2 examines the relative growth in
applications for subprime credit, and Table 3
examines the relative change in subprime rejection
rates. Again the application results are mixed
and very similar to the origination results. For
example, four states experienced a relative
increase and six states experienced a relative
decrease in applications. However, the rejection
rates tell a more consistent story. In most states,
rejection rates declined more in the treatment
locations than in the control locations, indicating
that the introduction of predatory lending laws
was associated with a disproportionate reduction
in the rejection rate for subprime applications.
Multivariate Evidence: Predatory
Lending Laws and the Flow of Credit
The previous section provided a univariate
analysis showing that predatory lending laws are
associated with reductions in rejection rates of
subprime applications, but have no consistent
effect on the volume of subprime credit. This
section extends this analysis by estimating the
probability of originating a subprime versus prime
loan, the probability of applying for a subprime
versus a prime loan, and the probability of being
rejected in a subprime application in probit model
specifications. The main additional benefit of
conducting a multivariate analysis is the ability
to control for multiple characteristics at once. The
previous univariate tables control only for time
and location through the construction of the data
set. This regression will be able to simultaneously
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11 The Texas sample consists of counties on the Texas-Louisiana
border. Because all sampled Texas counties (Harrison, Marion,
Newton, Orange, Panola, Sabine, and Shelby) are rural, few sub-
prime lenders were identified in the data and, hence, the number
of subprime loans might be deceptively small, especially in 2000.
This might explain the unusually large percentage increases in
applications and originations for Texas.
12 “Low income” includes households with income less than or
equal to 80 percent of the county median household income as
reported in the 2000 Census. “Minority” includes black and
Hispanic applicants as reported in HMDA.
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Table 1
Pre- and Post-Law Percent Change in Originations
All loans Minority Low-income
California, 2001-03
Treatment group 177.3 344.7 148.7
Control group 53.1 71.1 17.8
Difference 124.2 273.6 130.9
Connecticut, 2000-02
Treatment group 87.8 127.7 67.9
Control group 80.6 107.3 28.2
Difference 7.2 20.3 39.7
Florida, 2001-03
Treatment group 55.5 101.0 8.8
Control group 59.9 125.2 2.3
Difference –4.3 –24.3 6.5
Georgia, 2001-03
Treatment group 18.9 87.5 –14.0
Control group 46.2 108.1 29.6
Difference –27.3 –20.6 –43.6
Maryland, 2001-03
Treatment group 129.4 256.5 140.6
Control group 57.6 165.4 84.6
Difference 71.8 91.0 55.9
Massachusetts, 2000-02
Treatment group 56.4 134.8 17.1
Control group 69.6 107.4 8.2
Difference –13.2 27.4 8.9
North Carolina, 1999-2001
Treatment group –35.8 –35.7 –50.2
Control group –18.9 –30.1 –31.6
Difference –16.9 –5.6 –18.5
Ohio, 2001-03
Treatment group 3.2 4.2 –23.3
Control group 8.4 47.0 4.0
Difference –5.3 –42.8 –27.3
Pennsylvania, 2000-02
Treatment group –5.8 –48.4 –38.0
Control group –30.7 –59.1 –45.9
Difference 24.9 10.7 7.9
Texas, 2000-02
Treatment group 3,069.2 — —
Control group –12.6 –53.0 –46.3
Difference 3,081.8 — —
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Table 2
Pre- and Post-Law Percent Change in Applications
All loans Minority Low-income
California, 2001-03
Treatment group 110.0 268.1 81.3
Control group 43.3 123.4 31.5
Difference 66.7 144.6 49.8
Connecticut, 2000-02
Treatment group 43.4 51.9 29.1
Control group 59.8 34.7 35.4
Difference –16.4 17.2 –6.3
Florida, 2001-03
Treatment group 21.0 137.4 3.3
Control group 76.0 156.3 23.4
Difference –55.0 –18.9 –20.1
Georgia, 2001-03
Treatment group –16.2 72.1 –29.8
Control group 27.7 116.4 7.4
Difference –43.9 –44.3 –37.2
Maryland, 2001-03
Treatment group 77.2 258.7 71.0
Control group 33.3 238.5 32.7
Difference 44.0 20.1 38.4
Massachusetts, 2000-02
Treatment group 45.4 84.1 24.1
Control group 60.2 42.7 36.2
Difference –14.8 41.4 –12.1
North Carolina, 1999-2001
Treatment group –25.9 –37.9 –35.7
Control group 16.1 –28.3 3.3
Difference –42.0 –9.6 –39.0
Ohio, 2001-03
Treatment group –9.5 7.0 –27.5
Control group –2.8 52.8 –15.1
Difference –6.6 –45.7 –12.5
Pennsylvania, 2000-02
Treatment group 11.0 –42.8 –1.2
Control group –12.5 –57.3 –11.3
Difference 23.5 14.5 10.1
Texas, 2000-02
Treatment group 5,480.0 — 6,014.3
Control group –12.2 –53.6 –31.8
Difference 5,492.2 — 6,046.1
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Table 3
Pre- and Post-Law Percent Change in Rejection Rates
All loans Minority Low-income
California, 2001-03
Treatment group –33.4 –26.1 –25.0
Control group –13.3 10.9 –2.3
Difference –20.0 –37.0 –22.7
Connecticut, 2000-02
Treatment group –19.5 –17.0 –13.6
Control group –19.7 –23.7 2.2
Difference 0.2 6.7 –15.9
Florida, 2001-03
Treatment group –12.2 2.3 –3.5
Control group 2.8 1.9 –1.0
Difference –15.0 0.4 –2.6
Georgia, 2001-03
Treatment group –23.2 –13.0 –15.1
Control group –8.3 1.1 –10.8
Difference –14.9 –14.0 –4.3
Maryland, 2001-03
Treatment group –25.7 –6.9 –21.9
Control group –15.7 24.6 –20.5
Difference –9.9 –31.5 –1.3
Massachusetts, 2000-02
Treatment group –19.4 –25.5 –8.0
Control group –13.6 –18.8 9.7
Difference –5.7 –6.6 –17.7
North Carolina, 1999-2001
Treatment group 20.0 9.7 24.4
Control group 37.0 6.2 28.0
Difference –17.0 3.5 –3.6
Ohio, 2001-03
Treatment group –6.6 –1.2 –4.3
Control group –2.0 –4.5 –5.8
Difference –4.6 3.3 1.5
Pennsylvania, 2000-02
Treatment group 2.4 7.0 18.6
Control group 3.4 1.6 16.8
Difference –1.1 5.4 1.8
Texas, 2000-02
Treatment group 72.7 — 4.8
Control group –9.8 –7.9 –2.2
Difference 82.5 — 7.0
control for law characteristics, borrower charac-
teristics, location, and economic conditions on
both the control group (no law introduced) and
the treatment group (law introduced).
The basic data design is the same as in the
univariate analysis and includes only counties
in treatment states that border other states with-
out any treatment (control group) and subprime
loans under the loan limits indicated by the law.
Identification and Probit Estimation
Identification Strategy. To identify the effect
of a state predatory lending law, we include data
on the location and timing of the law as well as
borrower and location characteristics. Table 4
describes the variables and data sources. Similar
to Harvey and Nigro (2003 and 2004), three sepa-
rate dependent variables are tested to measure the
effects of state predatory lending laws—the prob-
ability of applying for a subprime loan (applica-
tion), the probability of originating a subprime
loan (origination), and the probability of being
rejected on a subprime application (rejection).
The key variable shown in Table 4 is Ineffect.
This variable indicates that a loan was made in a
location when and where a predatory lending law
was in effect. It is defined as zero before the law
went into effect, even in the treatment location,
and is always zero in the control location. Ineffect
is constructed by multiplying the variable Law,
which indicates locations where the law will
eventually be in effect, and Postlaw, which indi-
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Table 4
Identification Strategy and Control Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
Outcome
Application Indicator variable = 1 for subprime application HMDA & HUD
and 0 for prime subprime lender list
Origination Indicator variable = 1 for subprime origination HMDA & HUD
and 0 for prime subprime lender list
Rejection Indicator variable = 1 if subprime loan is denied HMDA & HUD
and 0 if accepted subprime lender list
Identification
Law Indicator variable = 1 if borrower is from a location Ho and Pennington-Cross
with a law at some point and 0 otherwise (2005)
Postlaw Indicator variable = 1 for post-legislation time period Ho and Pennington-Cross
and 0 otherwise (2005)
Ineffect Interaction of Law and Postlaw indicators indicating Ho and Pennington-Cross
that the borrower is from a location with a law (2005)
currently in effect
Control variables
Income Borrower’s gross annual income ($ thousands) HMDA
Loan2inc Ratio of requested loan amount to borrower’s income Calculated from HMDA
Relinc Ratio of tract median family income to MSA median HMDA
family income
Minority Tract’s minority population percentage HMDA
Vacant County’s percentage of vacant housing units Census 2000
Population County’s population growth from the calendar year Census Bureau
before and after the law went into effect
Unemployment County’s unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
cates the time period after a law has been put into
effect. Therefore, Law identifies the treatment
location and Postlaw identifies the time period
the lawwent into effect in that location. The refer-
ence group comprises locations where the preda-
tory lending laws will not be in effect in either
time period. There are no priors regarding the
coefficients on Law or Postlaw, because they
will capture prevailing probabilities associated
with location and time that are not controlled for
by other variables. Given the results from prior
research, we would expect Ineffect to be negative
for the application and origination outcomes and
potentially insignificant for the rejection outcome.
Both Harvey and Nigro (2003 and 2004) and
Elliehausen and Staten (2004) include a series of
control variables associated with the location of
the loan or loan application and the borrower
because they may affect the demand or supply
of subprime credit. In general, we expect that
borrowers will be more likely to use/apply for
subprime loans, and perhaps be rejected by sub-
prime lenders, in locations with difficult economic
conditions and when borrowers have lower
income or are in minority areas (Calem, Gillen,
and Wachter, 2004, and Pennington-Cross, 2002).
Economic conditions are proxied by the county-
level unemployment rate, housing vacancy rate,
and population growth rate. Borrower character-
istics are proxied by the percent of minority popu-
lation in the census tract and borrower income.
In general, we expect that applicants with more
income relative to their loan amount will have an
easier time meeting prime underwriting require-
ments. Underwriting requirements are proxied by
the loan-to-borrower income ratio. One important
caveat to this analysis is that the borrower’s credit
history, or credit score, which has been shown to
be a very important determinant of mortgage
performance for both subprime and prime loans
(Pennington-Cross, 2003), is not reported in the
HMDA data and therefore cannot be included in
this analysis. Lastly, perhaps because of minimum
scale requirements, prime lending may be more
available in locations with more households. As
a result, subprime may be more prevalent in loca-
tions with a smaller population.
Probit Estimation
A probit model is estimated for each outcome
and for each “law sample” (which includes the
treatment and control groups). Therefore, for each
sample, three probit models are estimated and a
total of 30 model estimates are generated that
include 10 explanatory variables each, for a total
of 300 estimated coefficients excluding intercepts.
The probit specification is given by
(5)
where Y is the outcome (application, origination,
or rejection), x is a vector of explanatory variables,
β is a vector of parameters, and Φ(.) denotes the
standard normal distribution. The log-likelihood
for the probit model is
(6)
where yi and are xi, respectively, the observed
values of outcome Y and explanatory variables x
for observation i.
Because of the large number of coefficient
estimates, instead of reporting all coefficients, we
provide summary information.13 Table 5 provides
context for the marginal effects by reporting the
mean of the dependent variables for each of the
law samples. It shows that there is a wide variety
in subprime application, origination, and rejection
rates. For example, subprime applications ranged
from almost 25 percent in California to just over
15 percent in Maryland. The relative magnitude
of application and origination rates provides
indirect support for the high rates of rejection on
subprime applications. In fact, in some of the law
samples, over 50 percent of subprime applications
were rejected.
Table 6 reports the marginal impact of a state
predatory lending law for each state while evalu-
ating all other variables at their means for each
law sample. Consistent with prior literature, the
results indicate that the North Carolina law did
reduce the flow of subprime credit through a
reduction in both application and origination
probabilities. But the experience in terms of
L x xi
y
i
yi i
= − ′( )  + ′( )
= =
∑ ∑ln ln ,1
0 1
Φ Φβ β
Pr | ,Y x x=( ) = ′( )1 Φ β
13 Detailed results are available upon request.
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originations and applications in North Carolina
is replicated in only one-half of the other state
laws examined. In the other half, the introduction
of the law was associated with an increase in the
flow (originations) of subprime credit. The results
are also mixed in terms of applications, with some
laws being associated with higher and other laws
associated with lower probabilities of application.
The effects of the state laws on the probability of
being rejected are a little more consistent, with 7
of the 10 laws being associated with lower rejec-
tion rates.
Table 7 provides a summary of coefficient
estimates for the remaining control variables for
the probit application, origination, and rejection
models. The first four columns report the mini-
mum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation
of the 10 estimated coefficients. The last column
reports the mean t-statistic associated with the
coefficients. There is no expected sign or even
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Table 5
Mean of Dependent (Outcome) Variables (percent)
Law sample (treatment and control groups) Application Origination Rejection
California 0.249 0.153 0.354
Connecticut 0.245 0.119 0.397
Florida 0.177 0.063 0.574
Georgia 0.224 0.097 0.505
Massachusetts 0.174 0.080 0.357
Maryland 0.153 0.064 0.439
North Carolina 0.233 0.111 0.484
Ohio 0.241 0.092 0.551
Pennsylvania 0.261 0.109 0.476
Texas 0.242 0.104 0.550
Table 6
Marginal Effects of Ineffect Variable
Law sample (treatment and control groups) Application Origination Rejection
California 0.032*** 0.067*** –0.258***
Connecticut 0.014** 0.023*** 0.013
Florida –0.030*** 0.008* –0.057***
Georgia –0.056*** –0.007** –0.110***
Massachusetts –0.074*** –0.032*** –0.030***
Maryland 0.029*** 0.018*** –0.066***
North Carolina –0.069*** –0.042*** –0.048***
Ohio –0.005 –0.004 –0.022**
Pennsylvania 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.032***
Texas 0.189*** 0.107*** 0.148*
NOTE: */*/*** indicate that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at the 90/95/99 percent levels. All other variables
are evaluated at the mean for each law sample.
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Table 7
Summary of Control Variable Coefficient Estimates
Coefficient t-Statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation Mean
Application results
Law –1.191 0.500 –0.032 0.447 2.621
Postlaw –0.254 0.156 –0.078 0.120 –8.530
Ineffect –0.288 0.765 0.031 0.299 –1.639
Income –0.319 –0.058 –0.176 0.083 –34.463
Loan2inc –0.001 0.032 0.012 0.012 9.622
Relinc –0.617 –0.215 –0.431 0.165 –41.554
Minority 0.274 0.819 0.550 0.153 35.074
Vacant –10.514 15.820 –0.207 6.704 –3.124
Population –0.119 0.059 –0.018 0.053 –5.243
Unemployment –5.393 16.539 7.503 6.453 13.972
Origination results
Law –0.807 0.230 –0.079 0.293 –1.223
Postlaw –0.509 0.067 –0.158 0.170 –8.510
Ineffect –0.229 0.759 0.103 0.279 1.999
Income –0.497 –0.039 –0.213 0.159 –19.529
Loan2inc –0.033 0.031 –0.002 0.018 –2.871
Relinc –0.615 –0.141 –0.388 0.156 –22.270
Minority 0.384 0.820 0.605 0.141 24.624
Vacant –9.833 4.701 –1.604 3.791 –4.108
Population –0.128 0.026 –0.022 0.055 –2.545
Unemployment –5.246 18.093 6.891 6.623 9.131
Rejection results
Law –0.377 1.837 0.197 0.599 3.088
Postlaw –0.263 0.321 –0.006 0.168 –0.194
Ineffect –0.469 0.373 –0.084 0.223 –3.927
Income –0.082 0.051 –0.031 0.043 –4.660
Loan2inc 0.001 0.055 0.022 0.017 7.779
Relinc –0.395 –0.018 –0.190 0.108 –9.553
Minority –0.038 0.242 0.125 0.087 3.447
Vacant –18.268 6.909 0.736 7.194 3.552
Population –0.033 0.098 0.016 0.040 0.407
Unemployment –7.209 26.239 1.147 9.270 –0.646
NOTE: These statistics provide a summary of the 10 models estimated. For example, the mean coefficient is the simple average of the
10 coefficient estimates for each variable and the standard deviation is the standard deviation of the 10 estimated coefficients.
significance associated with the Law and Postlaw
dummy variables because they control for unob-
served impacts of location and time in each law
sample. There are three measures of income
included in the model (borrower income, the ratio
of the requested loan amount to borrower income,
and the ratio of the tract to theMSAmedian family
income). As anticipated, on average, borrowers
with higher income are less likely to apply for
or get a subprime loan and are less likely to be
rejected on a subprime application. However, as
withmost of the control variables, there is substan-
tial variation in the sign and magnitude of the
coefficient estimates. Consistent with borrower
income, originations, applications, and rejections
are more likely in locations with relatively lower
incomes. In addition, as anticipated, applicants
requesting larger loans relative to their income
are more likely to be rejected.
Higher unemployment rates are also associated
on average with higher probabilities of application,
origination, and rejection, but the signs of the
coefficient estimates can be negative or positive.
In addition, weaker housing markets, proxied by
the vacancy rate and county population growth,
are inconsistently associated with application,
origination, and rejection probabilities. However,
consistent with prior research, locations withmore
minorities are associated with higher application,
origination, and rejection probabilities.
These results do not provide any indication
that predatory lending laws systematically reduce
the flow of subprime credit. However, the results
do show that predatory lending laws may be
associated with lower rejection rates of subprime
mortgage applications. It can be expensive just to
apply for a mortgage: The nonrefundable appli-
cation fee usually runs from $200 to $300, not to
mention other hidden or nonpecuniary costs.
Thus, although reducing rejection rates may not
have been the primary purpose of the laws, a
reduction in rejections can represent substantial
savings to consumers.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The introduction of state predatory lending
laws has created a situation in which a loan may
be legal and available in Missouri, but the iden-
tical loan is illegal and not available just across
the Mississippi River in Illinois. For example, in
Illinois, high-cost loans with prepayment penalties
in the first three years of the loans are prohibited,
whereas Missouri has no such provision.
This paper provided a framework to consider
some of the potential effects that the predatory
lending laws, such as the one in Illinois, would
have on the total or aggregate flow of high-cost
or subprime mortgage credit. This framework
indicates that laws that require tighter lending
standards should be associated with fewer origi-
nations and applications. However, if households
were deterred from applying for a loan because
they were afraid of being taken advantage of, the
introduction of a predatory lending law could lead
to more applications because the fear of predation
is reduced.
Consistent with this framework, univariate
and multivariate empirical results confirmed
that some laws were associated with increased
applications (for example, California, Connecticut,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas) and other
laws were associated with decreased applications
(for example, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, and
North Carolina).14 We interpret net increases in
applications as being consistent with a reduction
in fear of predation after the law was passed and
decreases in applications as consistent with a
reduction in the potential or legal size of the
high-cost market as a result of tighter lending
standards.
The laws in California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Texas were associated with
more subprime lending when a predatory lending
law was introduced into the subprime market.15
Therefore, these locations are more likely to have
been suffering from a strong lemons problem in
the mortgage market. In addition, these states tend
to have relatively modest restrictions on allowable
lending. In particular, four of these five states have
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14 Prior research has also found this mixed reaction in the market to
the introduction of regulations of high-cost mortgage lending (Ho
and Pennington-Cross, 2006, and Li and Ernst, 2006).
15 Conversely, the laws in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, and
North Carolina were associated with declines in the volume of
subprime lending.
no provision regarding mandatory arbitration
relief. Four of these five states also do not require
pre-purchase or post-purchase loan counseling.
In addition, balloon loans are only modestly
restricted or left unrestricted by these five state
laws. However, there does not seem to be any
pattern for these five states in how much of the
subprime mortgage market the law applies to.
In future research it would be helpful to deter-
mine how product mix adjusts to the introduction
of these laws. For example, the laws make no
distinction between initial interest rates on fixed
rate and adjustable interest rate loans. But adjust-
able rate loans tend to have lower initial rates,
resulting in substitution rather than fewer loans,
and can include teaser terms or caps on future
interest rate adjustment that could reduce the rate
below the benchmark or trigger. Therefore, adjust-
able rate loans may be one way to avoid the trigger
APR levels in predatory lending laws and shift a
borrower out from the protective coverage of the
regulations. There also may be a regulatory burden
associated with these laws that needs to be passed
on to consumers through higher interest rates and
upfront fees. In addition, these laws may reduce
the availability of the secondary market, leading
to liquidity issues in the subprime market, which
may also increase the cost of credit.
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APPENDIX
Some Details of 10 Predatory Lending Laws
California Connecticut
Effective date 7/1/2002 10/1/2001
Covered loan type Consumer credit transaction Any loan or extension of credit,
(HOEPA: closed-end, refinance)   $250,000 (adjusted every 5 years) including an open-end line of
credit but excluding a reverse
mortgage transaction
APR triggers APR > T-bill + 8% Like HOEPA
(HOEPA: APR > T-bill for both liens
+ 8% for first lien;
+ 10% for second lien)
Points and fees (P&F) trigger P&F > 6% loan amount P&F > 5% loan amount or $2,000
(HOEPA: P&F > 8% loan amount
or $499 [for 2004, adjusted
annually to CPI])
Prepayment penalties Prohibited after 36 months Restricted to 3% balance
within 1 year, 2% between
1 and 2 years, and 1% between
2 and 3 years; not allowed if
debts 50%  monthly gross income
Balloon Prohibited for loans < 5 years Prohibited for loans < 7 years
Loan counseling Not required Not required
Mandatory arbitration No provision Prohibited
limiting judicial relief
SOURCE: www.butera-andrews.com/state-local/b-index.htm; www.mbaa.org/resources/predlend/; Standard & Poor’s
“Anti-Predatory Lending Law Update” (September 20, 2004).
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Florida Georgia Maryland
10/2/2002 10/1/2002; 5/16/2002
amended 3/7/2003
Like HOEPA Any loan or extension of credit, All loans
including an open-end line of
credit but excluding a reverse
mortgage transaction
Like HOEPA Covered loan: APR > higher of 4% APR > T-bill + 7% (first lien)
(5.5% for second lien) above prime rate or 9% (second lien)
or 2% (3% for second lien) above
90-day standard delivery commitment
with comparable term;
high-cost: APR > higher of 2%
(3% for second lien) above Fannie/Freddie
or 4% (5.5% for second lien) above prime
Like HOEPA Covered loan: P&F > 3% loan amount; P&F > 7% loan amount
high-cost: P&F > 5% loan amount or $499 (for 2004)
for loans  $20,000, 8% loan amount
or $1,000 for loans < $20,000)
Prohibited after 36 months Restricted to 2% loan amount No provision
during first 12 months and 1%
loan amount during second year
Prohibited for loans < 10 years Prohibited for all loans No provision
Not required Required Required
No provision Prohibited No provision
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APPENDIX, cont’d
Massachusetts North Carolina
Effective date 3/22/2001 10/1/1999
Covered loan type Consumer credit transaction, Loans including open-end
(HOEPA: closed-end, refinance) excluding a reverse mortgage lines of credit but excluding
reverse mortgages,
amount   the lesser of
conforming limit or $300,000
APR triggers APR > T-bill + 8% (1st lien); Like HOEPA
(HOEPA: APR > T-bill + 9% (second lien)
+ 8% for first lien;
+ 10% for second lien)
P&F trigger P&F > 5% loan amount P&F > 5% loan amount
(HOEPA: P&F > 8% loan or $400 (adjusted annually) if loan  $20,000;
amount or $499 [for 2004, 8% loan amount of $1,000
adjusted annually to CPI]) if loan < $20,000
Prepayment penalties Prohibited after 36 months; Prohibited for all loans < $150,000
before 36 months, restricted to
balance of first year’s interest
or three-months’ interest,
whichever is less
Balloon payments Prohibited for all loans Prohibited
Loan counseling Required Required
Mandatory arbitration Prohibited No provision
limiting judicial relief
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Ohio Pennsylvania Texas
2/22/2002 6/21/2001 9/1/2001
All loans Loans < $100,000 Residential mortgages  $20,000
and <1/2 conforming limit,
excluding an open-end account
or a reverse mortgage
Like HOEPA Like HOEPA Like HOEPA
Like HOEPA Like HOEPA Like HOEPA
Prohibited Prohibited after 60 months Prohibited
Prohibited for loans < 5 years Prohibited for loans < 10 years Prohibited after 60 months
Not required Not required Not required
No provision No provision No provision
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